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The Unbearable Lightness of Seemings 
The principle of phenomenal conservatism states that “If it seems to ​S​ that ​p​, then, in the 
absence of defeaters, ​S​ thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that ​p” 
(Huemer 2007). Huemer, being the main defender of phenomenal conservatism, claims that this 
is a viable theory of justification, as well as a necessary truth (Huemer 2001). In this paper I will 
demonstrate the principle’s failure as a theory of justification due to its reliance on seemings. 
This reliance on seemings leads to a lack of precision when providing justification, which 
thereby causes phenomenal conservatism’s conception of justification to be so indeterminate as 
to render the justification phenomenal conservatism provides meaningless. This consequence is 
due to Huemer’s lack of precision when explaining the use of “seemings” in his theory. 
Furthermore, I will be building on Peter Markie’s arguments against phenomenal conservatism 
from his article “Searching for True Dogmatism” (2013), in which he states that seemings can be 
tainted by a subject’s desires and biases, leading to blameworthy beliefs justified by Huemer’s 
principle. I will object to Huemer’s counterarguments to this objection as formulated in 
Huemer’s article “Phenomenal Conservatism ​Ü​ber Alles” (2013).  
Phenomenal conservatism (from here on referred to as “PC”) has had to undergo changes 
over the years. When Michael Huemer first formulated the principle in ​Skepticism and the Veil of 
Perception​, he stated that seemings and appearances granted knowers with “At least prima facie 
justification” (99). His reasoning for this principle rests on his defense of direct realism and 
foundationalism: if the former is true, then perception grants us with direct access to the external 
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world. Our foundation for knowledge, then, lies non-inferentially in these perceptions: certain 
things about our experiences ​seem​ to be a certain way to us, this “seeming” provides us with 
justification for our beliefs about the content of our experiences. Because of direct realism’s truth 
(according to Huemer), our perceptions are generally veridical and therefore beliefs formed on 
the basis of our perceptions are generally justified until proven otherwise. What changed in 
Huemer’s formulation of PC from ​Skepticism and the Veil of Perception​ to “Compassionate 
Phenomenal Conservatism” involved a bit of a loosening on how much justification these 
perceptual beliefs received. The formulation underwent the change of giving perceptual beliefs 
“[P]rima facie justification” to, instead, “[A]t least some degree of justification”. In other words, 
perceptual beliefs based on seemings are not so strong as to be held justified until proven 
otherwise, but they do provide a knower with ​some​ justification (just how much exactly is not 
clear, but likely depends on a variety of factors) in the absence of any beliefs that would defeat 
the seeming.  
The reason for this change was due to criticisms of Huemer’s original principle that 
suggested that it doled out a considerable level of justification too loosely (Steup 2004 offers a 
prime example of this criticism). In giving beliefs prima facie justification solely because they 
are based off of appearances, Huemer’s principle provides justification to seemings that would 
otherwise never seem justifiable. Furthermore, once PC is applied to other seemings, such as 
“intellectual seemings”, or intuitions, then plenty of morally reprehensible beliefs would also be 
given justification. For example, if a religiously zealous person were to contemplate how their 
god would want them to express their devotion, it may seem to them intuitive that god may want 
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them to do so by bombing an abortion clinic. Under PC’s original formulation, an intellectual 
seeming of this nature would be justified until proven otherwise.  
What does the new iteration of PC do?  In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” 
Huemer states that the revised principle does not grant full justification to appearance-based 
beliefs, but instead grants at least a certain extent of justification; as a result, PC 2.0 expands the 
scope of the previous version, no longer solely applying to non-inferential knowledge (1). How 
are we to interpret the new formulation’s granting of justification to “[A]t least some degree”? 
According to Michael Tooley, Huemer will grant either of the following interpretations: 
 
Modest PC 1: If it seems to ​S​ that ​p​, then, in the absence of defeaters, that raises the 
h​                                 probability of ​p 
Modest PC 2: If it seems to ​S​ that ​p​, then, in the absence of defeaters, that justifies ​S​ in 
h​                                 believing ​p​ more strongly than would be the case in the absence of the 
h​                                 relevant seeming (Tooley 2013) 
 
As we can see, the revised formulation is much more restrained than the original. In each reading 
of the new PC’s take on justification, appearances are granted with nothing more than a 
supporting role in providing the subject’s belief with justification. Are there ever propositions 
which, solely on the basis of a seeming, are worth believing in? Just how strongly does a 
seeming affect the probability of a belief’s truthfulness? The answers to these questions would at 
least partially lie in Huemer’s explanation of what he means by “seems”. 
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Unfortunately, Huemer does not ever explicitly define what he means by “seems”. In 
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception​, Huemer distinguishes seeming-states from beliefs, in what 
he describes as “[A]n attempt to identify a special class of foundational beliefs” (99). 
Additionally, he makes clear that seemings are not only exclusive to perceptual experiences, but 
also expands the scope of seemings to memory and intuition (ibid.). What is not clear about the 
explication of “seems” in this text is what exactly it is like for it to seem to ​S​ that ​p​. In other 
words, what effect is a “seeming” supposed to have on ​S​?  
In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” he describes “seemings” as a 
propositional attitude, and terms mental states that accompany seemings “appearances” (1). We 
may be getting a little warmer, but we are not quite where we want to be. According to Tooley, 
Huemer defined a seeming as an “Assertive mental representation” in a private correspondence 
he had with him (“Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism” 309). As 
Tooley goes on to point out in his paper, “assertive” when describing “seeming” is a 
metaphorical usage of the word. How this metaphor is ever meant to be cashed out, Tooley and I 
are not sure. As Tooley states in his article, if seemings are assertive mental representations that 
are distinct from beliefs but make the subject inclined to believe its content, then Huemer will 
need to explain how a mental state with content ​p​, that pushes the subject towards belief in 
content ​p​ can also be compatible with the subject not necessarily believing that ​p​ (311). 
Huemer has most recently written about what he means by “seems” in “Phenomenal 
Conservatism ​Ü​ber Alles”. He states that the way he employs “seemings” most closely 
resembles the epistemic understanding of the word, as compared to any phenomenal or 
comparative understanding. In his own words: “[A]ppearances are a source of defeasible 
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epistemic justification. They also normally incline one to believe their content” (331). Now we 
know that when Huemer speaks of ​p​ seeming a certain way to ​S​, he is speaking in a roughly 
epistemic sense: the way ​p​ seems to ​S​ is ​in itself​ an epistemic justification, and pushes ​S​ to 
believe the content of the way ​p​ appears to them. Now that we are caught up to speed on 
Huemer’s project, we can see if it actually proves to be a viable theory of justification.  
If a person is rational and deems that a certain belief is not justifiable, then the belief 
should be dismissed until sufficient justification is gathered in order to warrant its adoption. 
What we use to determine whether a belief is justified or not is a theory of justification. A theory 
of justification, therefore, should provide us with assistance when evaluating beliefs and their 
supporting evidence. A solid and reliable theory of justification is essential if our goal is to attain 
beliefs that are veridical. Does Huemer’s PC manage to accomplish this feat? 
It is not clear that PC has given us an actual method of determining whether beliefs are 
justified or not. In the most current formulation of PC, Huemer claims that a “seeming”, or 
appearance, of a belief to a subject is sufficient to warrant at least ​some​ ​justification for that 
subject to hold that belief. Examples that Huemer himself provides involve memory-related 
seemings, “I seem to remember that Saturn is the fifth planet from the sun”, intellectual 
seemings, “That the shortest path between any two points is a straight line seems to be true”, and 
perceptual seemings, “This tomato seems to be red” (​Skepticism ​99).  The seemings are, 
according to Huemer, providing our belief in each of these instances with some amount of 
justification. But are all seemings equal? Is my belief that the sun is bright, supported by the 
appearance of the sun’s brightness, equally justified to my belief that I fed my dog this morning, 
supported by the memory of me feeding my dog? Given what Huemer has said about his use of 
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seemings, we will now dive deeper into his theory and see how each of its components are meant 
to work.  
If PC is a theory of justification, then it should help us determine whether a given 
proposition is worth believing or not. However, there appear to be two questions, one of which I 
have alluded to above, that Huemer has not adequately addressed:  
 
1. Given that seemings only provide us a ​degree​ of justification, how much 
justification ​exactly​ does a seeming provide?  
2. Are all propositions supported by seemings, regardless of the seeming’s source 
and context, justified?  
 
Without clarificatory remarks that can address the concerns attached to these questions, the 
principle will run into a variety of problems that render it an implausible theory of justification. 
Given that Huemer speaks of seemings as an occurrence which raises the probability of a 
proposition’s truthfulness, it is only fair that we ask him how exactly this would work within the 
principle when applied to a set of examples. Let us examine a few low stakes, everyday 
seemings, and try to determine how justified we would be in believing its accompanied 
propositions 
 
1. It seems to me that this analog clock reads “7:15” 
2. It seems to me that the dalmation that just ran past me has less than 50 spots 
3. It seems to me that, after glancing at this grape vine, it contains 34 grapes 
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Either these seemings give their accompanied propositions justification to the same degree, or 
each seeming provides a different amount of justification. Let us first assume that the seemings 
from these examples carry the same justificatory weight. Assuming I know how to read an 
analog clock (and I do), then I have good reason to believe that this clock I am looking at, which 
seems to have its hour hand on seven and its minute hand on three, reads “7:15”. Am I just as 
justified in believing that the clock reads “7:15” based off of it seeming to say so as I am 
justified in saying that a dalmation, running past me at a quick pace, seems to have less than 50 
spots on it? I believe it is not a stretch to say that I am. I do not think that dalmations have many 
spots on them, perhaps they have around 20, but if one quickly passes me by I am not able to 
precisely count its exact number of spots. However, this seeming is not accompanied by a 
proposition with an exact number. Rather, the dalmation just seemed to have any number of 
spots less than 50. Let us now look at the third example, in which I quickly glance at a bundle of 
grapes, and derive a seeming from this glance that leads me to believe that there are 34 grapes 
exactly bundled together by a vine. It does not seem likely that I would be able to count so many 
grapes in a glance that probably took less than a couple seconds. Could it really be that the 
seeming in this final example is equally justified to the seemings from our first two examples? If 
Huemer thinks that all beliefs based on seemings have the same amount of justification, then the 
most uncontroversial seemings we may experience in everyday life would have just as much 
weight as the most ludicrous seemings we could derive. Considering that PC would be obviously 
implausible if all seemings are equal, I will assume that Huemer believes that seemings do not 
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confer equal amounts of justification. I will now attempt to determine whether PC would fare 
better if this is the case.  
Huemer speaks of seemings as conferring justification in degrees. Because we have seen 
that not all seemings can plausibly provide the same amount of justification, we must settle on a 
way to determine with precision, or at the very least rough approximation, the value of a given 
seeming, and determine how we can compare between seemings that give more justification as 
opposed to those that give less. Let us recall one of the interpretations Huemer grants of PC’s 
notion of conferring justification in degrees: the presence of a certain seeming that ​p​ to subject ​S 
raises the probability of ​p​. It has been established that seemings do not provide prima facie 
justification. As a consequence of this, we must not take seemings to provide so much 
justification that a proposition is likely to be more probable than not solely on the basis of the 
proposition’s seeming.  
How exactly does a seeming play its role then? We can look at an expanded version of 
the dalmation example from earlier in an attempt to arrive at an answer to this question. Three 
people gaze at the dalmation as it passes each of them at a fast speed. A seeming pertaining to 
the dog’s spots appears to each observer:  
 
1. To one person it seems like the dog must have less than 60 spots 
2. To a second person it seems like the dog must have between 20 and 40 spots 
3. To the third person it seems like the dog must have more than 15 spots 
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Each seeming is uncontroversial, but do any of these seemings make a significant contribution to 
whether or not any of the accompanied propositions would be considered justified true beliefs, or 
knowledge? How are we to know how this notion of a seeming raising the probability of ​p 
cashes out? If seemings provide the subject with a belief that has a higher probability of being 
true than if the belief were not accompanied by a seeming, then Huemer should provide more 
details as to how that is supposed to work in a theory of justification that only takes seemings 
into account. This issue is further emphasized by the inability of seemings to provide full 
justification, meaning that they can at best make a proposition only slightly more probable. If 
that is the case, then how are we supposed to use PC as a way to get fully justified beliefs?  
A similar issue arises with the other interpretation of how seemings are supposed to 
confer justification. In the other interpretation, in which a seeming that ​p​ justifies a subject ​S​ to 
believe that ​p​ more than if there were not a seeming that ​p​, we do not have the problem of 
attempting to determine the increase of probability of ​p​ ​being true when taking into account its 
seeming. However, we still do not have a fully working theory of justification that explains how 
to arrive to a point in which we are ​sufficiently​ ​justified in believing that ​p ​. What we can 
conclude from analyzing both readings of PC is that Huemer’s theory of justification does not 
help us arrive at justified beliefs. Unfortunately, no matter how we look at Huemer’s theory, it is 
still unclear how seemings are supposed to work when justifying beliefs. If Huemer is not able to 
explain just how seemings provide us with justification, then any justification that a seeming 
may provide under PC is rendered meaningless. At best, we have to look at seemings as bringing 
an unbearably light amount of justificatory weight.  
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Moving forward, I am going to determine whether or not all seemings actually bear 
justificatory weight. My concerns here are due to how seemings are always subjective. Can our 
seemings therefore be tainted by our subjective perspectives, which can be informed by biases, 
desires, and other aspects of our psychology that can lead to self-deceit? Markie details how a 
seeming may be epistemically appropriate or not. In instances in which seemings are informed 
by certain mental states, such as one’s desire, the derived belief could be epistemically 
inappropriate in that the seeming caused the situation to appear in such a way that it became 
unreliable, epistemically speaking (“Searching for True Dogmatism” 257).  
The notion of epistemic appropriateness and how it is susceptible to the subjectivity of 
seemings is made clear by Markie’s example, in which two prospectors derive seemings while 
searching for gold. The more experienced prospector of the two has developed all the skills 
involved in correctly identifying gold, and uses those skills to guide his perceptions in such a 
way that he can “simply see” that a nugget is gold. The less experienced prospector lacks this 
perceptual training, and is driven by greed. His desire to find gold right away leads him to “[S]ee 
what he wants to see”, leading him to derive seemings that cause epistemically blameworthy 
beliefs (ibid.). In both instances each prospector experienced seemings about the world, and it is 
clear that both seemings had different justificatory weight. The experienced prospector derives 
seemings about gold that have a higher likelihood of corresponding with the way the world is, 
this is due to information he possesses that pertains to the correct identification of gold. On the 
other hand, the other prospector is not in a place in which his derived seemings have as much 
justificatory weight. Not accounting for the difference between their respective seemings appears 
to be an issue for PC.  
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Huemer addresses these objections in “Phenomenal Conservatism ​Ü​ber Alles”. He 
provides three cases in which a subject might have an appearance induced by a deceptive mental 
state. In the first case, the subject is aware that the seeming they experience is caused by their 
deceptive mental state, and thereby has a defeater that makes belief in the proposition 
accompanying the seeming unjustifiable (343). Therefore, in this case PC wins. In the second 
case, the subject is once again aware that a seeming they are experiencing is being caused by a 
certain mental state, but they are not sure whether the mental state is reliable. Huemer believes 
the subject would have no reason to conclude that the mental state is deceptive, and therefore the 
subject would have justification for believing in the accompanied proposition (344). In the final 
case, the subject is unaware of the mental state that is causing the seeming. Due to the subject not 
being aware of the “[A]ppearance’s etiology”, then the seeming and it’s conjoined proposition 
therefore seem rational to the subject, thereby making the belief in it justifiable (ibid.).  
Psychological research on belief perseverance provides a response to each of Huemer’s 
cases. In the counter-cases Huemer provides, either we know whether the mental state is 
deceptive or not, or we are either aware or unaware of the mental state itself. There is a 
presupposition in each of Huemer’s responses that, if we are aware of the mental state that is the 
source of a given seeming, we would be able to epistemically evaluate its ability to produce a 
seeming that reliable corresponds with the world. In other words, given that under PC’s current 
formulation a seeming can confer justification to a belief in the absence of evidence that 
contradicts the seeming, Huemer is presupposing that a subject is always able to correctly 
identify a defeater and adequately revise their belief accordingly. If we are able to recognize and 
correctly evaluate the source of a seeming and its epistemic value, assuming that the seeming 
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ultimately leads to a justifiable belief, then the seeming does indeed have justificatory weight. 
However, considering the conclusions reached by Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980), we have 
reason to believe otherwise.  
The paper attempts to gain understanding of the phenomenon of belief perseverance, in 
which people may persevere in holding onto a belief despite having little evidence, or even 
evidence which has been refuted. The authors of this paper performed two experiments, each 
consisting of a group of people being told information pertaining to the relationship between 
risk-taking and success as a firefighter (1038). The participants were then given cases in which 
they had to predict the success of a firefighter at accomplishing a task according to the 
information they were given regarding risk taking and success rates. On the basis of the 
information that was given to them, the participants would perceive the potential success rates of 
the firefighters in these case studies (1041-1042). Once the subjects had made a few predictions 
by referring to the information they were given, they were told that the information they had 
received was actually bogus. However, despite being informed about the falsehood of the 
information they had received, they still perceived a relation between a firefighter’s risk-taking 
and his potential success in a way that is in accordance with the debunked information, 
demonstrating how “[E]ven after the intitial evidential bases for their beliefs [had] been totally 
refuted, people fail[ed] to make appropriate revisions in those beliefs” (1042).  
This experiment serves to illustrate the unreliability of seemings as sources of 
justification. The subjects in the experiment underwent seemings in relation to how they 
perceived the connection between risk taking and success as a firefighter. These seemings were 
induced and informed by information they were given. The subjects were eventually told that the 
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information they had received was fictitious. If PC were correct, then this experiment would not 
serve as a counter-example had the subjects been able to employ the defeater made explicitly 
present to them to revise their beliefs, thereby overcoming the deceitful quality of their seemings. 
Considering that the subjects were ​unable​ to do this, it looks possible that a subject may not be 
able to tell whether the way ​p​ ​seems to them has its origin in a tainted source. What this 
demonstrates is that even in cases in which a defeater is present to us when considering whether 
to believe in a certain proposition, thereby rendering the accompanying seeming void of any 
justificatory value, we may still unwittingly make belief judgments based on that seeming. If we 
cannot always rely on seemings, or find a way to account for this kind of self-deception, then PC 
is an implausible theory of justification.  
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